“Al-Julani: From Terrorist to Politician.”

 

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“#Al-Julani: From #Terrorist to #Politician.”

Researcher Claire Hajjaj, a Palestinian, oversaw a program aimed at rehabilitating his image and training him in political and media discourse. This transformation project was not spontaneous, but rather part of a broader plan to rebrand armed figures in a new political guise to serve international and regional interests. #Syria...In 2020, the Turkish intelligence service introduced Ahmad al-Sharaa to the CIA agents as the new leader of Syria, so that the CIA agents could work on him, as they say, to change him from a terrorist to a politician, while such a thing is impossible/

The political teacher Ahmed Al-Shara is a Palestinian named Claire Hajjaj, who is a member of the Turkish intelligence forces. He was previously in Iraq and worked for Saddam Hussein. He worked in Iraqi intelligence until 2003 and played a key role in the genocide of the Kurds. After the overthrow of Saddam, he cooperated with the Americans to identify some of the leaders of the Iraqi Baath Party. Then he became a member of the secret forces of ISIS in Syria under the name of the Palestine Brigades in the terrorist government of ISIS, which led thousands of Palestinians to join ISIS through this person.

#MOSSADIL_COMMENTARY:

CREATING A MODERATE FROM A JIHADI IS SELF-PRESERVATION The reason you’re hearing that Al-Jolani is “moderate” has almost nothing to do with Al-Jolani. It has everything to do with Europe running out of time. Now, quick side note before I go on. What I’m about to say is my analysis. People can disagree with it. There are counterarguments, and some of them are reasonable. But I think this explains what we’re seeing better than most of the surface-level takes. Al-Jolani didn’t change. He didn’t abandon jihadist ideology. He didn’t suddenly become a different person. He didn’t decide to run a normal state. What changed is the pressure on the West, especially in Europe. Europe today is dealing with roughly one and a half million Syrian refugees. Germany alone has close to a million. These numbers already shape elections, housing, policing, welfare, everything. But here’s the part that usually gets skipped. These numbers aren’t static. They grow over time. And they don’t just grow slowly. They grow generationally. Birth rates in Muslim migrant communities across Europe are significantly higher than native European averages. That means today’s numbers are not the ceiling. They’re the starting point. From the perspective of European governments, this isn’t just about managing the present. It’s about what Europe looks like in twenty or thirty years if nothing changes. That pressure is real, whether people like talking about it or not. And it helps explain why migration has become the political issue across Europe. Governments are falling. Coalitions are cracking. Voters want to see movement, not theory. So governments start looking for exits. And that’s where Syria comes back into focus. Because as long as Syria is treated as totally unsafe, temporary protection stays. Asylum stays. Returns don’t happen. Politically, a lot of governments don’t think that’s sustainable forever. So the language shifts. You start hearing that Syria is “stabilizing.” You hear that sanctions can be lifted. You hear that refugee returns are possible. And then, quietly, you start hearing that Al-Jolani is “pragmatic” or “contained.” But let’s be clear about who he actually is. Al-Jolani comes straight out of Al Qaeda’s Syrian branch. His system is still Islamist. In areas under his control, minorities live under pressure. Alawites. Shiites. Christians. Druze. Kurds. Women don’t have real freedom. Political opposition doesn’t exist. This isn’t controversial in intelligence or security circles. It’s widely understood. And the timing matters. On December 13, 2025, two U.S. servicemen were killed in Syria by a suicide bomber. That attacker didn’t come out of nowhere. He came from networks tied directly to Al-Jolani’s inner security environment. People close to him. People who help enforce his rule. That happened days ago. And yet the narrative didn’t stop. It barely paused. Why? Because this isn’t really about whether Al-Jolani is moderate. It’s about whether Syria can be described as governable again. Once Syria is framed as stabilizing, a chain reaction starts. First come voluntary return programs. Cash incentives. Help with transport. Then residency renewals get tighter. Benefits become conditional. Then pressure builds quietly, case by case, until returns aren’t really voluntary anymore. This pattern isn’t new. And here’s the uncomfortable part people don’t like saying out loud. If Israel were hosting hundreds of thousands, or millions, of Syrian migrants, and those numbers were growing generation by generation, and that reality was reshaping politics and public life, Israel would probably do the same thing. It would emphasize order over ideology. Stability over doctrine. Not because it believed the story, but because states under pressure do what they think they must to survive. That doesn’t make the narrative true. But it does make it understandable. The risk is what this teaches.