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IRAN ELECTION: MOUSSAVI ADVISOR CLAIMS MOJTABA IS BEHIND VOTE FRAUD
Date:2009 June 16, 15:55 (Tuesday) Canonical ID:09LONDON1423_a
Original Classification:SECRET,NOFORN Current Classification:SECRET,NOFORN
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https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09LONDON1423_a.html
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TAGS:ECON - Economic Affairs--Economic Conditions, Trends and Potential | IR - Iran | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PHUM - Political Affairs--Human Rights | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism | UK - United Kingdom Concepts:-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:-- Not Assigned -- Type:TE - Telegram (cable)
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From:United Kingdom London Markings:-- Not Assigned --
To:Iran Iran Collective | Secretary of State
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1. (S/NF) Summary: Moussavi advisor and former Iran nuclear
negotiator claims that Mojtaba Khamenei, acting in concert
with IRGC Jafari and other officials in the Supreme Leader's
office, has been a major force behind vote manipulation, and
current measures to repress pro-Moussavi demonstrations in
the street, according to expat broadcast commentator and
author Ali Reza Nourizadeh. Nourizadeh further reported that
Moussavi and Rafsanjani, are beginning to fear being caught
in a situation where they must because of the democratic
logic and principles espoused by their supporters, make
maximalist demands on the regime, but in so doing may
undermine the legitimacy of a form of government of which
they themselves are founders and major beneficiaries. End
summary.
Former Nuclear Negotiator
Moussavian the Key Source
-------------------------
2. (S/NF) Prior to Iran's June 12 election, VOA contract
broadcaster Nourizadeh told London Iran Watcher (Poloff) of
two lengthy one-on-one meetings Hashemi Rafsanjani reportedly
held with Khamenei, on June 4 and 9. Media widely reported
the second meeting, at the conclusion of which Rafsanjani had
declared a positive outcome to his discussions with the
Supreme Leader on election transparency and non-interference.
Nourizadeh told Poloff his source, ahead of the press
reports, for details of these meetings had been "senior
advisors" to Rafsanjani and the Moussavi and Karroubi
campaigns. In conversations June 14-16 Nourizadeh elaborated
to Poloff that his sources included candidate Karroubi
himself, film director and now Moussavi spokesman Mohsen
Makhbalouf, and former nuclear negotiator and
Moussavi/Rafsanjani advisor Hossein Moussavian, with whom
Nourizadeh claimed to have met in Vienna in person in May and
with whom he claims to speak by phone "more than ten" times
per day.
Alleged Backroom Discussions
Between Moussavi/Rafsanjani
and Khamenei's Office
-----------------------------
3. (S/NF) Nourizadeh's incremental verbal reports to Poloff
cite Moussavian as his principal source on efforts by
Rafsanjani and Moussavi to enlist the support of senior
clergy in Qom in opposing the election results and on
complex, behind the scenes talks the Moussavi camp is
allegedly holding with the Supreme Leader's office.
Karroubi, though apparently not Rezai, is a party to such
talks.
Logic of Election Protests Dictates
Maximalist Demands by Moussavi
-----------------------------------
4. (S/NF) Nourizadeh claims that on June 14 and again on
June 15 (unspecified) Supreme Leader representatives had
offered the Moussavi camp, in which Nourizadeh says
Rafsanjani is "of course" included, the right to pick "half
the cabinet" (ministries unspecified), an offer Nourizadeh
said Rafsanjani/Moussavi had rejected out of hand as
inadequate and politically untenable in any case. Nourizadeh
explained that anything short of a complete change of the
election result would cause both Rafsanjani and Moussavi to
lose all credibility with their currently impassioned
supporters. Nourizadeh argued that a maximalist demand, for
nullification of Ahmedinejad's victory and a two-candidate
runoff between Moussavi and Ahmedinejad, is the only
politically viable position or goal the Moussavi camp can
espouse.
"Debates Were a Mistake"
------------------------
5. (S/NF) Early on June 16 Nourizadeh said the Moussavi
opposition leaders were distressed by the fatalities of the
evening before but were determined to press their case
through expanded street demonstrations today. The Moussavi
camp reportedly was nervous, for the first time, telling
Nourizadeh it is concerned over what it may have started, and
that holding the TV debates "may have been a mistake" given
the alienation produced within Iran.
Moussavi Advisors'
Claims about Mojtaba
--------------------
6. (S/NF) Asked by Poloff to reconstruct what personalities
and forces lay behind the apparent regime attempt to grossly
manipulate the election -- Nourizadeh claimed that all his
interlocutors in the Moussavi camp believe the entire affair
represents a power grab by Mojtaba Khamenei, with tactical
and logistical planning for the move going back six months or
more. Nourizadeh said he had no direct proof himself of
Mojtaba's role but that the Moussavi camp believes Mojtaba's
principal allies to be IRGC commander Jafari and Basij
commander Hossain Taeb. Nourizadeh commented that Qalibaf
had long been a focus of Mojtaba's support and aspirations
but that Qalibaf had, by his own repeated comparisons of his
own potential to the late strongman Reza Khan (Reza Pahlavi's
father), irretrievably alienated Supreme Leader Khamenei.
7. (S/NF) Nourizadeh further alleged that, according to his
interlocutors in Moussavi's camp, Supreme Leader Khamenei had
begun personally to weaken under the tremendous pressure of
events in recent months, and that his general medical
condition, exacerbated by opium abuse, have contributed to a
stronger behind-the-throne position for Mojtaba and his IRGC
allies. Nourizadeh claimed the publicly released photos of
Khamenei and Mojtaba's recent visit to Sanandoj were the
first public photos of the two together and for that reason
quite significant. Nourizadeh said his interlocutors
indicate that Mojtaba is far less risk-averse than his
father. He also opined it is highly unlikely the Supreme
Leader on his own would have risked alienating so many other
major figures among regime founders, but that Ahmedinejad is
attractive to Mojtaba as an executive whom Mojtaba reportedly
believes he and his key allies can control much more easily
than elder statesmen such as Rafsanjani or Moussavi.
Energy Levels High As
Expats Sweat for Moussavi
-------------------------
8. (SBU) The feverish atmosphere in Nourizadeh's London
office (at the NGO Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies) June
16 was that of a political campaign office late on election
night. The lightly-orchestrated chaos included Nourizadeh
rushing between simultaneous meetings in different rooms and
on different phone lines with callers and delegations from
Arabic, Farsi, and U.S. media and activists while his small
staff monitored Iran video and websites and fielded a deluge
of phone calls from Iran and elsewhere. Poloff was able for
the most part to stay out of sight. By way of flagging his
own role in shaping public opinion in Iran and various Arab
countries, Nourizadeh listed for Poloff the Arab, French, UK
and U.S. media for whom Nourizadeh said he has been doing a
dozen or more Arab and Farsi language interviews and
commentaries daily for the past week in addition to his usual
VOA and Radio Free Europe venues: Al Arabiyah, LBC of
Lebanon, Radio Zamaneh, Nile Satellite channel and several
Egyptian and Morrocan channels, Al Jazeerah (David Frost),
and BBC Arabic and English -- Nourizadeh claimed to have
turned down repeated BBC Persian interview requests.
Comment
-------
9. (S/NF) The backroom charges against Mojtaba, while not
implausible in themselves, and though they do echo claims
made by Karroubi about Mojtaba after the 2005 elections,
provide exactly the narrative that an aggrieved candidate,
protesting his own loyalty but seeking major redress, would
want to have available if needed. It is also noteworthy
that Nourizadeh in his report and analysis of current behind
the scenes discussions makes no clear distinction between
Moussavi and Rafsanjani as actors or parties of interest.
10. (S/NF) Additionally, Nourizadeh's June 14 reports to
Poloff, on the Moussavi/Rafsanjani response to events,
emphasized efforts to generate support from the Qom clergy,
efforts which appear partially but not dramatically
successful to date. The main focus among Nourizadeh's
interlocutors has shifted noticeably since the weekend, away
from enlisting senior clerics and to the street, where new
"facts on the ground" may soon be established either by the
collective action by urban Iranians, or by the brutality of
the regime's response.
11. (S/NF) In the same vein, Nourizadeh noted to Poloff the
Moussavi camp is beginning to fear that popular feeling
against electoral fraud and the abuses that spawned it may
have grown beyond their own limited electoral aims, to the
point where popular support for the Islamic Republic itself
may be at risk; this would be a development well beyond the
aims of these leading 1979 revolutionaries, and founders of
that republic. It is at the same time not at all implausible
that Nourizadeh, an anti-Shah activist in his youth but now
no friend to the Islamic Republic, may be exaggerating or
distorting the apprehensions of Moussavi's advisors for
Poloff's benefit, whether due to cynical manipulation or his
own wishful thinking.
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