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fredag 11 maj 2018

wikileaks revealed the Iranian regime in southern africa
wikileaks revealed the Iranian regime in southern africa
Date:2009 June 16, 15:55 (Tuesday) Canonical ID:09LONDON1423_a
Original Classification:SECRET,NOFORN Current Classification:SECRET,NOFORN
Handling Restrictions-- Not Assigned --

Character Count:9324
Executive Order:-- Not Assigned -- Locator:TEXT ONLINE
TAGS:ECON - Economic Affairs--Economic Conditions, Trends and Potential | IR - Iran | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PHUM - Political Affairs--Human Rights | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism | UK - United Kingdom Concepts:-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:-- Not Assigned -- Type:TE - Telegram (cable)
Office Origin:-- N/A or Blank --
Office Action:-- N/A or Blank -- Archive Status:-- Not Assigned --
From:United Kingdom London Markings:-- Not Assigned --
To:Iran Iran Collective | Secretary of State

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and (d) 

1.  (S/NF) Summary: Moussavi advisor and former Iran nuclear 
negotiator claims that Mojtaba Khamenei, acting in concert 
with IRGC Jafari and other officials in the Supreme Leader's 
office, has been a major force behind vote manipulation, and 
current measures to repress pro-Moussavi demonstrations in 
the street, according to expat broadcast commentator and 
author Ali Reza Nourizadeh.  Nourizadeh further reported that 
Moussavi and Rafsanjani, are beginning to fear being caught 
in a situation where they must because of the democratic 
logic and principles espoused by their supporters, make 
maximalist demands on the regime, but in so doing may 
undermine the legitimacy of a form of government of which 
they themselves are founders and major beneficiaries.  End 

Former Nuclear Negotiator 
Moussavian the Key Source 

2.  (S/NF) Prior to Iran's June 12 election, VOA contract 
broadcaster Nourizadeh told London Iran Watcher (Poloff) of 
two lengthy one-on-one meetings Hashemi Rafsanjani reportedly 
held with Khamenei, on June 4 and 9.  Media widely reported 
the second meeting, at the conclusion of which Rafsanjani had 
declared a positive outcome to his discussions with the 
Supreme Leader on election transparency and non-interference. 
 Nourizadeh told Poloff his source, ahead of the press 
reports, for details of these meetings had been "senior 
advisors" to Rafsanjani and the Moussavi and Karroubi 
campaigns.  In conversations June 14-16 Nourizadeh elaborated 
to Poloff that his sources included candidate Karroubi 
himself, film director and now Moussavi spokesman Mohsen 
Makhbalouf, and former nuclear negotiator and 
Moussavi/Rafsanjani advisor Hossein Moussavian, with whom 
Nourizadeh claimed to have met in Vienna in person in May and 
with whom he claims to speak by phone "more than ten" times 
per day. 

Alleged Backroom Discussions 
Between Moussavi/Rafsanjani 
and Khamenei's Office 

3.  (S/NF)  Nourizadeh's incremental verbal reports to Poloff 
cite Moussavian as his principal source on efforts by 
Rafsanjani and Moussavi to enlist the support of senior 
clergy in Qom in opposing the election results and on 
complex, behind the scenes talks the Moussavi camp is 
allegedly holding with the Supreme Leader's office. 
Karroubi, though apparently not Rezai, is a party to such 

Logic of Election Protests Dictates 
Maximalist Demands by Moussavi 

4.  (S/NF) Nourizadeh claims that on June 14 and again on 
June 15 (unspecified) Supreme Leader representatives had 
offered the Moussavi camp, in which Nourizadeh says 
Rafsanjani is "of course" included, the right to pick "half 
the cabinet" (ministries unspecified), an offer Nourizadeh 
said Rafsanjani/Moussavi had rejected out of hand as 
inadequate and politically untenable in any case.  Nourizadeh 
explained that anything short of a complete change of the 
election result would cause both Rafsanjani and Moussavi to 
lose all credibility with their currently impassioned 
supporters.  Nourizadeh argued that a maximalist demand, for 
nullification of Ahmedinejad's victory and a two-candidate 
runoff between Moussavi and Ahmedinejad, is the only 
politically viable position or goal the Moussavi camp can 

"Debates Were a Mistake" 

5.  (S/NF) Early on June 16 Nourizadeh said the Moussavi 
opposition leaders were distressed by the fatalities of the 
evening before but were determined to press their case 
through expanded street demonstrations today.  The Moussavi 
camp reportedly was nervous, for the first time, telling 
Nourizadeh it is concerned over what it may have started, and 
that holding the TV debates "may have been a mistake" given 
the alienation produced within Iran. 

Moussavi Advisors' 
Claims about Mojtaba 

6.  (S/NF) Asked by Poloff to reconstruct what personalities 
and forces lay behind the apparent regime attempt to grossly 
manipulate the election -- Nourizadeh claimed that all his 
interlocutors in the Moussavi camp believe the entire affair 
represents a power grab by Mojtaba Khamenei, with tactical 
and logistical planning for the move going back six months or 
more.  Nourizadeh said he had no direct proof himself of 
Mojtaba's role but that the Moussavi camp believes Mojtaba's 
principal allies to be IRGC commander Jafari and Basij 
commander Hossain Taeb.  Nourizadeh commented that Qalibaf 
had long been a focus of Mojtaba's support and aspirations 
but that Qalibaf had, by his own repeated comparisons of his 
own potential to the late strongman Reza Khan (Reza Pahlavi's 
father), irretrievably alienated Supreme Leader Khamenei. 

7.  (S/NF) Nourizadeh further alleged that, according to his 
interlocutors in Moussavi's camp, Supreme Leader Khamenei had 
begun personally to weaken under the tremendous pressure of 
events in recent months, and that his general medical 
condition, exacerbated by opium abuse, have contributed to a 
stronger behind-the-throne position for Mojtaba and his IRGC 
allies.  Nourizadeh claimed the publicly released photos of 
Khamenei and Mojtaba's recent  visit to Sanandoj were the 
first public photos of the two  together and for that reason 
quite significant.  Nourizadeh said his interlocutors 
indicate that Mojtaba is far less risk-averse than his 
father.  He also opined it is highly unlikely the Supreme 
Leader on his own would have risked alienating so many other 
major figures among regime founders, but that Ahmedinejad is 
attractive to Mojtaba as an executive whom Mojtaba reportedly 
believes he and his key allies can control much more easily 
than elder statesmen such as Rafsanjani or Moussavi. 

Energy Levels High As 
Expats Sweat for Moussavi 

8.  (SBU) The feverish atmosphere in Nourizadeh's London 
office (at the NGO Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies) June 
16 was that of a political campaign office late on election 
night.  The lightly-orchestrated chaos included Nourizadeh 
rushing between simultaneous meetings in different rooms and 
on different phone lines with callers and delegations from 
Arabic, Farsi, and U.S. media and activists while his small 
staff monitored Iran video and websites and fielded a deluge 
of phone calls from Iran and elsewhere.  Poloff was able for 
the most part to stay out of sight.  By way of flagging his 
own role in shaping public opinion in Iran and various Arab 
countries, Nourizadeh listed for Poloff the Arab, French, UK 
and U.S. media for whom Nourizadeh said he has been doing a 
dozen or more Arab and Farsi language interviews and 
commentaries daily for the past week in addition to his usual 
VOA and Radio Free Europe venues:  Al Arabiyah, LBC of 
Lebanon, Radio Zamaneh, Nile Satellite channel and several 
Egyptian and Morrocan channels, Al Jazeerah (David Frost), 
and BBC Arabic and English -- Nourizadeh claimed to have 
turned down repeated BBC Persian interview requests. 


9.  (S/NF) The backroom charges against Mojtaba, while not 
implausible in themselves, and though they do echo claims 
made by Karroubi about Mojtaba after the 2005 elections, 
provide exactly the narrative that an aggrieved candidate, 
protesting his own loyalty but seeking major redress, would 
want to have available if needed.   It is also noteworthy 
that Nourizadeh in his report and analysis of current behind 
the scenes discussions makes no clear distinction between 
Moussavi and Rafsanjani as actors or parties of interest. 

10.  (S/NF) Additionally, Nourizadeh's June 14 reports to 
Poloff, on the Moussavi/Rafsanjani response to events, 
emphasized efforts to generate support from the Qom clergy, 
efforts which appear partially but not dramatically 
successful to date.   The main focus among Nourizadeh's 
interlocutors has shifted noticeably since the weekend, away 
from enlisting senior clerics and to the street, where  new 
"facts on the ground" may soon be established either by the 
collective action by urban Iranians, or by the brutality of 
the regime's response. 

11.  (S/NF) In the same vein, Nourizadeh noted to Poloff the 
Moussavi camp is beginning to fear that popular feeling 
against electoral fraud and the abuses that spawned it may 
have grown beyond their own limited electoral aims, to the 
point where popular support for the Islamic Republic itself 
may be at risk; this would be a development well beyond the 
aims of these leading 1979 revolutionaries, and founders of 
that republic.  It is at the same time not at all implausible 
that Nourizadeh, an anti-Shah activist in his youth but now 
no friend to the Islamic Republic, may be exaggerating or 
distorting the apprehensions of Moussavi's advisors for 
Poloff's benefit, whether due to cynical manipulation or his 
own wishful thinking. 

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